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It was with the sincerest pleasure that the faculty and students of
the Law School received the announcement of the appointment of

Alfred J. Schweppe as Dean of the school, to take office at the beginning of the next school year. No better qualified, nor more promising
man could have been selected for the position. His ability as a teacher
has already been demonstrated.

He comes to the University of

Washington after a brilliant record as a student at the University of
Wisconsin, and of Minnesota, and as a practicing lawyer in Seattle.
Mr. Schweppe has had offers of positions from Minnesota and
California, and the University of Washington is to be congratulated
on securing him.
THE EXEMPTION LAWS OF WASHINGTON-Remington's Compiled
Statutes for 1922, Section 563, specifies what property shall be exempt
from execution and Section 703 specifies the amount of wages exempt
from garnishment. This note will discuss these two exemption sections
only and will not include the homestead law, which in a sense is itself
an exemption law.
In general, Section 563 provides for the exemption of the following
property- (1) All private libraries not to exceed five hundred dollars in
value, and all family pictures and keepsakes; (2) all wearing apparel
of every person or family; (3) to each family, household furniture in
the amount of five hundred dollars; (4) cows, calves, swine, with feed

for same, bees, etc., and if no such property is desired any other property not to exceed two hundred fifty dollars in value in lieu of such
animals; (5)

all firearms kept for the use of any person or family;

(6) all the tools of the person's trade.

Section 703 provides .for the
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exemption of wages from garnishment in the amount of ten dollars

per week in case of suit to collect for necessities and in the amount of
one hundred dollars in case of suit to collect for non-necessities.
All the provisions of Section 563 are clearly expressed and the
interpretation is clear with the exception of sub-division number four.'
This sub-division is termed the "in lieu of" statute. Around this
clause of the statute many interesting cases have arisen. To claim
this exemption the statute requires the person to be a householder and
Section 5652 defines who shall be a householder in the state of Washington.

Questions continually arising under the "in lieu of" statute are
whether an automobile, corporate stock and the like can be claimed as

exempt in lieu of animals not to exceed two hundred fifty dollars in
value. The statute seems to allow such exemption in clear terms and
yet there has been considerable controversy over this part of the statute.
The first case of importance interpreting the "in lieu of" statute was
the case of Creditors Collection Association v. Bisbee.' In that case
money was claimed as exempt under the statute. However, the case
laid down the rule that the words "other property" in lieu of the
certain specified domestic animals, meant property of a like nature
under the rule of ejusdem genris.4
Hence, money could not be
selected in lieu of such exempt property
In the case of Lewnagre v. Acme Stamp Works,' our court overrules
in part Creditors Collection Association v. Bisbee, supra, and lays
down the present day rule to be applied to this class of cases. In this
case the court held that shares of stock could be selected by a householder in lieu of the animals named in the statute. The court says in
overruling the Bisbee case that that case is not in consonance with the
general rule of liberality in construing exemption statutes.6 The court
says the decision overlooked the obvious intent of the legislature to
'"To each householder, two cows, with their calves, five swine, two stands
of bees, thirty-six domestic fowls, and provisions and fuel for the comfortable
maintenance of such householder and family for six months, also feed for such
animals for six months: Provided, that in case such householder should not
possess or shall not desire to retain the animals above named, he may select
from his property and retain other property not to exceed two hundred and

fifty dollars, coin, in value."
'Householder defined--"A householder, as designated in all statutes relating to exemptions, is defined to be: (1) The husband and wife, or either(2) Every person who has residing with him or her, and under his care and
maintenance, either, (a) His or her minor child, or the minor child of his or

her deceased wife or husband, (b)" etc.

's80 Vash. 358, 141 Pac. 886 (1914).
'Ejusdem generis. Of the same kind or nature; of the same class. In
the construction of statutes, contracts and other instruments, where an enu-

meration of specific things is followed by a general word or phrase, the latter
is held to refer to things of the same kind as those specified.
'98 Vash. 34, 167 Pac. 60 (1917).

'It is firmly established principle that exemption laws must be liberally

construed in favor of the debtor. Mikkelson v. Parks, 3 Wash. T. 527, 19
Pac. 31 (1888) Dennis v. Kass, 11 Wash. 353, 39 Pac. 656 (1895)
Puget
Sound Packing Co. v. Jelfs, 11 Wash. 466, 39 Pac. 962 (1895) North Pacific
Loan Co. v. Bennett, 49 Wash. 34, 94 Pac. 644 (1908) State ex rtel. McKee v.
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grant an exemption to any householder of any property to the value of
two hundred fifty dollars, as is manifested clearly by the attending
provision which states that if the householder shall not desire to retain
the animals mentioned he may select from his property, not such property or other like property, but merely other property without any
limitation whatsoever. This Washington decision is conclusive that
any property, disregarding entirely the rule of elusdem generis, may be
selected in lieu of the animals mentioned, with one absolute qualification as contained in Section 703,7 that wages and salaries cannot be
exempted in lieu of other property and the possible qualification that
money cannot be exempted in lieu of other property.
In the case of In re Crook," a decision by Judge Neterer, the court
in interpreting the statute in bankruptcy proceedings held dearly that
the bankrupt could select any property in lieu of the animals named
except money, which the court states is all that Creditors' Collection
Association v. Bisbee held. Judge Neterer says in his opinion that in
view of the purpose of the statute to protect the welfare of the unfortunate, and the further fact that exemption statutes have always been
liberally construed, it would seem that the conclusion is inevitable that
the debtor can select from his chattel property other property than the
animals mentioned without limitation.
In Hills v. Joseph, in the Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit,
Judge Rudkin affirmed the rule of In re Crook and held that a householder could select in lieu of the animals mentioned, merchandise from
his stock in trade. The court considered and 11
explained the previous
°
decisions of In re Schezer and In re Swanson.
From these cases the logical conclusion is that any property whatsoever in the amount of two hundred fifty dollars may be claimed as
exempt in lieu of animals, with the possible exception of money. The
state courts might even allow money in lieu of such animals, but the
federal courts have clearly announced a contrary rule.
In applying Section 703, providing for the exemption of wages from
garnishment proceedings, to a particular state of facts, one must ask
himself three major questions: 1. Did the defendant have a family
dependent upon him for support at the time of the service of the
writ and of the answer thereto? 2. Are the wages and salary garni.
sheed recompense for personal services rendered by the defendant? 3.
Is the garnishment grounded upon a debt for actual necessaries furnished to the defendant?
To have an exemption under this statute the first two questions
McNeill, 58 Wash. 47, 107 Pac. 1028 (1910) Beecher v. Shaw, 44 Wash. 166,
87 Pac. 71 (1906), Lemagio v. Acme Stamp Works, 98 Wash. 34, 167 Pac. 60
(1917) In re Crook, 919 Fed., 979 (1915) Hills v. Joseph, 0-29 Fed. 865 (1916)
In reT Swanson, 913 Fed. 353 (1914).
"And provided further that no money due or earned as wages or salary
shall be exempt from garnishment in lieu of any other property'
919 Fed. 979 (1915).
929 Fed. 865 (1916).
" 188 Fed. 744 (1911).
1913 Fed. 353 (1914).
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must be answered in the affirmative. The answer to the third merely
determines the amount of the exemption. If the answer to the third
question is "No" then an exemption of one hundred dollars may be
allowed. If the answer is "Yes" then only an exemption of ten
dollars a week is allowed, with a limit of four weeks.
In answer to the first question the courts have held that a man has
a family dependent upon him if he has a wife, although the wife helps
to support the family,12 or if he has a daughter of age, but out of work
and with no income.
The courts also hold that where the wife,
aged mother, or minor son or daughter has no income, then clearly
the father has a family dependent upon him.
In answer to the second question the courts lay down the rule that
by earnings is meant the reward of labor or the price of personal
services performed. Hence gains of a person derived from services of
labor without the aid of capital would be earnings. 14 A person engaged to superintend the erection of a building has been held a laborer
within the meaning of a statute exempting the wages of such person
from garnishment. 1 In Adcock v. Smith-6 the court held that where
a person is employed by an iron company to puddle iron at a fixed rate
per ton receiving his pay monthly on a particular day and is required
to begin and quit work at certain hours, his compensation constitutes
wages for personal services within the meaning of the exemption laws.
7
Even bonuses have been held to be wages.1
With respect to the reduction of the exemption to ten dollars per
week where the claim is for necessaries furnished, it is contended very
seriously that this section of the statute is rendered unconstitutional by
reason of the recent decision in the case of Verino v. Hickey.18 In
that case the respondent had recovered a judgment of $631.30 for work
and labor performed. Execution was issued and the sheriff levied on
certain personal community property consisting of household furniture
and wearing apparel. The appellants duly claimed the property as
exempt under the provisions of Remington's Compiled Statute, Section
563. The respondent contended that the property was not exempt
from execution because of the provisions of Section 564. This section
provides as follows: "No property shall be exempt from execution for
z Ness v. Jones, 10 N. D. 587, 88 N. W 706 (1901). The husband was
engaged in business and during the period he was so engaged the wife managed the home farm and supplied the necessaries for the support of the
family with only slight assistance from her husband. The husband and wife
had lived together on the home prenuses and the former was not disabled nor
unwilling to labor for the support of Ins family. Held. That the husband
was the head of the family within the exemption statute.
"Although a daughter is of age the father owes a moral duty to support
her if she has no source of income. By the great weight of authority this
moral duty is sufficient to class the father as having a family dependent upon
him. In re Opava, 235 Fed. 779 (1916) Webster v. McGowan, 8 N. D. 0-74,
78 N.4 W 80 (1899).
" Jones v. Nicoll, 7- Misc. Rep. 483, 131 N. Y. Sup. 341 (1911).

"Moore v. Henry, 14 Md. 558 (1859).
Tenn. 373, 37 S. W 91 (1896).
"Laird v. Carte, 196 N. Y. 169, 89 N. E.822 (1909).
1335 Wash. Dec. 17, 237 Pac. 5 (1915) see 1 WVAsH. L. REv. 209.
3697
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clerks', laborers', or mechanics' wages earned within this state, nor for
actual necessaries, not exceeding fifty dollars in value or amount furnished to the defendant or his family within sixty days preceeding the
bringing of an action therefor, nor shall any property be exempt from
execution issued upon a judgment against an attorney or agent on
account of any liability incurred by such attorney or agent to his client
or principal on account of any monies or other property coming into
his hands from or belonging to his client or principal. Provided that
nothing herein shall be construed as repealing or in any wise affecting
Section 703 infra." Held That the portion of the statute which provides that no property shall be exempt for clerks', laborers' or mechanics' wages is unconstitutional as an infringement of the exemption rights
under Article 19, Section 1, of the state constitution, and a violation
of the equal privileges and immunities guarantee of Article 1, Section
12. The rule which the court adopts is that the legislature cannot
constitutionally classify general debts and general debtors upon a basis
of different natures of debts so that all such general debtors will not
have equal immunity of exemption as against all forced sales to satisfy
their general debts.
In support of the rule which is apparently
adopted, the court cites Tuttle v. Strout"0 and Bofferding v. Mengelkoch. 0
If such is the rule, then that part of the statute which limits the
rights of exemption where the claim is for necessaries is also unconstitutional. Following the same rule as applied to the provision of Section 703, limiting the exemption from garnishment to $10 per week,
where the claim is for necessaries furnished, would also render such
provision unconstitutional. If it is unconstitutional to give the laborer,
the clerk or the mechanic a greater immunity from claims of exemption
than any other general creditor then it would seem that it is equally
unconstitutional to give the doctor, the grocery man, or the landlord
any greater immunity. They are all general creditors, the distinction
being in the nature of the debts. It is submitted that under the
rule adopted by the court in Terno v. Hickey supra, that part of Section 703, which provides that if the garnishment be founded upon a
debt for actual necessaries furnished to the defendant for his family or
dependents, no exemption shall be allowed in excess of $10 out of each
week's salary,21 is also unconstitutional, not on the theory that it is
an abridgement of the judgment debtor's exemption rights under
Article 19, Section 1, of the state constitution, but that it grants to
certain general creditors privileges and immunities which it denies to
other general creditors, in violation of the provisions of Article 1,
Section 12, of the constitution.
This concludes the court's general interpretation of the statutes providing for exemptions. One important feature, however, remains to
be discussed. When must a claim for exemption be made in order that
7 Minn. 465, 82 Am. Dec. 108 (1862).
129 Minn. 184, 152 N. W 135 (1915).
A similar provision in the Minnesota statutes was declared unconstitutional, see Bofferding v. Mengelkoch, supra.
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The general rule is well settled that in the
the claim be timely?
absence of an express statute22 the claim for exemption must be made
within a reasonable time and a claim 2 made at any time before sale
under execution comes within the rule.
The courts of Washington have held that a judgment against a
garnishee defendant is the same as a sale under execution. In the
case of United States Fidelity Co. v. Hollenshead2 4 the defendant made
no claim for exemption until after trial on the garnishment proceedings
and announcement of the judgment against the garnishee defendant.
On the day prior to the formal entry of the judgments, the defendant
made his claim for exemption. Held That it was not timely. This
case then merely holds that the defendant is bound to set up his every
claim or demand before trial to the end that the court shall not render
an improvident judgment. In the course of its opinion the court says
that a garnishment is a proceeding in rem and that the effect of the
judgment in such proceeding is to put the parties in a like position as
if the sheriff had made a sale of personal property and paid the proceeds into the registry of the court to be applied in satisfaction of the
This case was cited and affirmed in the case of Hanson v.
judgment.
25
Hodge.
A claim for exemption is therefore timely in Washington if made
at any time before judgment in garnishment proceedings or before
sale under execution or attachment.
Maurice W Orth.
POWER OF CORPORATION TO DISCHARGE THOSE EMPLOYED UNDER
CONTRACT FOR TERM OF YEARS-This note will be limited to an
exposition of the law of the state of Washington with only a brief

reference to that of foreign states.
Unfortunately for the prospective employee of a Washington corporation, the right to discharge him, even though employed under
written contract for a term of years, is regulated by statute. The
pertinent clause reads that the corporation shall have power "to
appoint such officers, agents, and servants as the business of the corpora-

tion shall require, to define their powers, prescribe their duties, and to
fix their compensation.
"To require of them such security as may be thought proper for
the fulfillment of their duties and to remove them at will except that

no trustee shall be removed from office unless by a vote of two-thirds

1
of the stockholders as hereinafter provided."
Whatever the law might be, in the absence of this express declaration of the legislature, is not in issue, for the law-making branch of

=Washington has no express statute on this point.
I State ex rel. Hill v. (ardner 32 Wash. 550, 73 Pac. 690 (1903) United
States Fidelity Co. v. Hollenshead, 51 Wash. 396, 98 Pac. 749 (1909) Messenger
v. Murphy, 33 Wash. 353, 74 Pac. 480 (1903).
251 Wash. 326, 98 Pac. 749 (1909).
192 Wash. 426, 159 Pac. 388 (1916).
'Rem. Comp. Stat., § 3809 [5], P C. § 4515 [5].

